Are Possible Worlds Real? Modal Realism Part 1 – Philosophy Tube

I think that what makes a modal statement true is the fact that accepting it doesn't cause a contradiction. In that sense, I think that the proposition "I could have been ginger" which is true can be transformed to
It wouldn't be a contradiction to affirm that Abigail is ginger
In this actual world that's of course true and that's why modal statements are true, but that doesn't mean necessarily that there's an actual world in which Abigail is ginger.

I am writing an essay about conterfactual history, and with my limited formation in Philosophy and Logic I had enormous trouble trying to understand Lewis, Kripke, etc; let alone discover how to use it in my work. You saved my essay!!! thanks

We're the Twilight Zone episodes about possible worlds?

You looked and sounds like Christ Board from Aboard in Japan

I kind of forgot how she used to present as a guy wow.

Is it jist me, or is the face overlappedslappedflappycjacked photoshopud overr an oval?

In this case, in terms of fiction in literature, we can then say that they are factual and truth in their own realms/worlds according to Lewis' theory… correct?

3:00 spiffing brit?

One way to resolve this I think is to say that modal statements are never, in actuality, true. If the universe is deterministic then it is not true that things could be any different than the way they are. Modal statements would then be only conventionally useful as thought experiments, but not actually true statements.

But if we have a world where dallas buyers club has never ben made and Leo won best actor we also can very well imagine another world where dallas buyers club has never ben made and Leo didnt win best actor. So what is the point in having a statement that is true and false in the same time? Also, we dont have any causality in this statement wich makes it even less usefull. Maybe in our first possible world dallas buyers club has never ben made but Loe won the best actor because he just did better or was ginger and the jury happend to like that.
I dont see any use in a model wich makes ever statement about possible worlds true and false at the same time.

Ours, of all possible worlds can engage in the activity of "existing", because it has this mysterious property "concreteness"? Luck us!
How is "concreteness" any more a property and any less merely indexical than "existence"?

Hot take; modal statements aren't true. The proposition that x could have been y if z was different isn't describing the real x, y or z since all of these exist only as they do in the actual world, or as an example: I might have never written this comment isn't true because whoever I am is the person who wrote this, and this comment is written, and the actual world is the world in which I wrote the comment. There is no world where I didn't, and saying I might not have is to suppose a possible world exist, and it doesn't, so the statement is false. I'm not comitted to this way of thinking but it makes sense to me.

Oh Olly, if only you knew what you will become….

I hold to a slightly different theory of possible worlds, wherein, first of all, physicalism is necessarily true, so all possible worlds are physical worlds, and secondly, possible worlds do not contain time, because other times and other possible worlds are exactly the same kind of thing ontologically: the present is the actual world, and other ways that the physical universe could be arranged constitute other possible worlds, some of which bear a relationship that we call "causal" with the present, actual world, a relationship that does not necessarily create a unique ordering of possible worlds, which is to say that there may be multiple possibilities that are future to the actual world, and even multiple possibilities that are past, although because the causal relationship is entropic in nature, there are necessarily fewer pasts than futures, and over any measurable stretch of time, different possible pasts rapidly converge, while different possible futures diverge freely.

This also results in a picture that is entirely equatable with the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics, despite your claims to the contrary.

What if its just a feature of the english language

I think a P.W. is a logically consistent math concept like a triangle but with the properties of a world. Also all P.W. are a math set of all logical concepts that are worlds. The set of P.W. is like a set of all logically consistent geometrical shapes, but instead of shapes u use worlds. *The properties of a world could be defined many ways, as long there is no equivocation it is OK to define them differently (and as long as the definition of a world include the actual world otherwise it would be a useless set most of the time)

Is there a possible world where possible worlds can interact?

What if your counterpart is a necessitarian?

How can one be justified in believing that possible worlds actually exist? The statement: "It is possible that it is raining right now" is made possible because there is a POSSIBLE world in which it is raining. If that particular possible world, in which it is raining, actually exist then the statement (from my point of view) looses the quality of being possible. It becomes a statement that is simply true in one world and false in another. The truth of the statement in one world (that exist) can not refer to possibility in our world because it now IS another world, not just POSSIBLE versions of the actual world, but other actual worlds, nonidentical with our world. Redefinition of my question: How can we uphold possibility if we actualize possible worlds?